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Abstract 
The study assesses the relationship between terrorism and social media from a cross section of 
148 countries with data for the year 2012. The empirical evidence is based on Ordinary Least 
Squares, Negative Binomial and Quantile regressions. The main finding is that there is a 
positive relationship between social media in terms of Facebook penetration and terrorism. 
The positive relationship is driven by below-median quantiles of terrorism. In other words, 
countries in which existing levels of terrorism are low are more significantly associated with a 
positive Facebook-terrorism nexus. The established positive relationship is confirmed from 
other externalities of terrorism: terrorism fatalities, terrorism incidents, terrorism injuries and 
terrorism-related property damages. The terrorism externalities are constituents of the 
composite dependent variable. 
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1. Introduction  
The positioning of this study builds on three main tendencies in scholarly and policy-making 
circles, notably: (i) the growing challenge of terrorism across the world, (ii) the policy 
concern of social media in fuelling violence and terrorism and (iii) gaps in the literature1.  
These points are substantiated in chronological order.   
 First of all, terrorism is a growing challenge to the prosperity of nations. It is important 
to note that, terrorism is defined in this study as the actual and threatened use of force by sub-
national actors with the purpose of employing intimidation to meet political objectives 
(Enders & Sandler, 2006). Accordingly, recent geopolitical events such as the 2011 Arab 
Spring have increased externalities of weak and failed states such civil war and terrorism 
across the Middle East, Africa and Asia (GTI, 2014; Asongu et al., 2018a). As we shall 
substantiate below, even developed countries have been experiencing the negative 
externalities of this terrorism phenomenon. To put this point into more perspective, Libya in 
the post-Gaddafi era has become a failed state owing to inter alia: various rebel factions 
fighting to have control over the country and determine the laws in the country in order to 
chart a post-conflict course of economic development. The narrative maintains that Yemen is 
also a failed State reflecting the same characteristics because the fragile politico-economic 
and social situation of the country is being fuelled by wars that are fought by more 
technically-advanced countries with geopolitical objectives (Asongu et al., 2018a). For 
instance, Saudi Arabia and Iran are backing antagonistic elements behind the fragile political 
situation in Yemen. The political stalemate in Syria has resulted in considerable negative 
consequences for neighbouring countries (e.g. Lebanon and Iraq), especially with the rise and 
fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). According to the narrative, in Africa, 
the Boko Haram in Nigeria has been causing social turmoil in the country as well as in 
neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Niger and Chad (Solomon, 2017; Asongu & 
Biekpe, 2018).  
 More developed countries have not been immune to the recent waves of terrorist 
attacks because of a number of notable incidences, which include: the aborted 2015 attacks in 
Verviers, Belgium; the Australian-Sydney crisis in December 2014; the February 2015 attacks 
in Australia; the “Charlie Hebdo” 2015 incidence in Paris, the November 2015 attacks in 
France and the  July 2015 attacks at the “Promenade des Anglais” in Nice and the stream of 
attacks in Great Britain (22nd of March 2017 Westminster attack, 22nd of May 2017 
                                                          
1Social media and Facebook are used interchangeably throughout the study because of data availability 
constraints in the other social media indicators. 
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Manchester Arena bombing, 3rd  of June 2017 London attack, 19th of  June Finsbury Park 
Attack and 15th of  September London tube train attack). Among possible determinants of 
terrorism, social media has been documented as a mechanism by which recruitments of 
terrorists and propaganda of terrorism is channelled (Gates & Podder, 2015).  
 Second, there is no consensus in the literature on the policy concerns surrounding the 
role of social media in fuelling terrorism. This is essentially because one strand of the 
literature is of the position that social media accelerates political instability and violence 
(Dreyfuss, 2017a; Browning, 2018; Patton et al., 2014; Storrod & Densley, 2017; Bejan, 
2018; Dean, Bell & Newman, 2012; Taylor, Fritsch & Liederbach, 2014). Conversely, a 
contending strand maintains that social media can be employed to reduce violence and 
political polarization (Barberá, 2015; Parkyn, 2017). Concerning the former framework, the 
positive incidence of social media on the 2011 Arab Spring has been documented by 
Wolfsfeld et al. (2013) while Bastos et al. (2015) have established the connection between 
protests and social media. With regard to the contending strand, Barberá (2015) has 
established that social media can increase political harmonization which is susceptible of 
decreasing political anger that can fuel terrorism. Furthermore, the strand of the literature is 
also supported with the position that unrests can be reduced through collaborative and 
networking mechanisms (Parkyn, 2017). The narrative maintains that social media can 
provide a good platform on which discussions between rebel factions can take place in order 
to assuage externalities such as political instability and terrorism. Surprisingly, as apparent 
from Section 2 and further perusal of the existing studies, empirical literature on the relevance 
of social media on terrorism is sparse.  
 Third, the highlighted gap in the literature is apparent because social media is a 
relatively new phenomenon. According to attendant narratives, the importance of social media 
has not been given the necessary scholarly attention. The sparse empirical literature is 
traceable to constraints in data availability. This is essentially because, there are only five 
macroeconomic empirical studies using Facebook penetration as a measure of social media. 
Jha  and Sarangi (2017) have investigated how Facebook penetration influences corruption. 
The effect of Facebook penetration on natural resource governance has been examined by 
Kodila-Tedika (2018) whereas Jha and Kodila-Tedika (2018) have assessed if democracy is 
driven by Facebook penetration. Asongu and Odhiambo (2019a, 2019b) have assessed the 
relationships between social media, governance and tourism.  
 Noticeably from the above, this study adds to the recent strand of studies on 
development consequences of social media by exploiting the new dataset in order to assess 
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the nexus between Facebook penetration and terrorism. The positioning also responds to 
recent policy concerns on the sparse documentation of the consequences of social media 
(World Bank, 2016). Moreover, exploratory discourses on the relevance of social media in 
terrorism have not been backed with empirical validity (Patrikarakos, 2017). Hence, this study 
contributes to the terrorism literature by putting some empirical validity to discourses in order 
to establish whether the purported positive nexus between terrorism and social media 
withstands empirical scrutiny. The attendant research question is the following: what is the 
relationship between social media and terrorism? 
 In order to provide an answer to the underlying research question, the study uses a 
cross section of 148 countries with data for the year 2012. The empirical evidence is based on 
Ordinary Least Squares, Negative Binomial and Quantile regressions. The main finding is that 
there is a positive relationship between Facebook penetration and terrorism. The positive 
relationship is driven by below-median quantiles of terrorism. In other words, countries in 
which existing levels of terrorism are low are more significantly associated with a positive 
Facebook-terrorism nexus. The established positive relationship is confirmed from other 
externalities of terrorism: terrorism fatalities, terrorism incidents, terrorism injuries and 
terrorism-related property damages. 
 The inquiry is positioned as an applied research study because the intuition for 
assessing the nexus between social media and terrorism is sound, given that information 
technology can be used to organise and coordinate terrorism activities. In essence, applied 
research is not exclusively based on the acceptance or rejection of existing theories, but could 
provide the basis for theory-building. Hence, this study is consistent with the extant literature 
in arguing that applied research that is based on sound intuition is a useful scientific activity 
(Costantini & Lupi, 2005 ; Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016).  
 The positioning of the study on the nexus between social media and terrorism also 
departs from contemporary global information technology management literature which has 
focused on inter alia: the importance of globalisation in patterns of information technology 
(Lee & Joshi, 2016); differences in the diffusion of social media across cultures (Khan & 
Dongping, 2017); patterns of combined usage of information technology and innovation in 
Europe (Billon et al., 2017); cultural practices and virtual social network diffusion (Krishnan 
et al., 2016); progress in the international hyperlink network (Barnett et al., 2016); youth civic 
engagement behaviour on social media (Warren et al., 2016; Montgomery & Xenos, 2008; 
Valenzuela et al., 2012); linkages between information technology, information sharing and 
inclusive development (Afutu-Kotey et al., 2017; Asongu & Boateng, 2018; Bongomin et al., 
6 
 
2018 ; Gosavi, 2018; Humbani & Wiese, 2018; Isszhaku et al., 2018; Minkoua Nzie et al., 
2018; Muthinja & Chipeta,  2018; Abor et al., 2018; Tchamyou, 2019; Tchamyou et al., 2019)  
and determinants of information technology in developing countries (Asongu et al., 2018b).  
The rest of the study is structured as follows. A review of existing literature is covered 
in Section 2 while the data and methodology are disclosed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results while Section 5 concludes with implications and future research directions. 
 
2. Review of existing literature  
2.1 Drivers and deterrents of terrorism  
The terrorism literature has failed to engage the dimension of social media as a driver 
of terrorism. As summarized in Table 1, the surveyed literature has failed to engage the 
element of social media, probably because of data availability constraints. The surveyed 
literature is expanded in four main strands, namely: (i) foreign aid and policy; (ii) democracy, 
civil liberties and state failure; (iii) welfare and foreign occupation and (iv) military 
expenditure. 
First, with regard to the nexus between policy and terrorism, Savun and Phillips 
(2009) have investigated why countries that are associated with better democratic values are 
more likely to be affected by transnational terrorism. The authors have concluded that, the 
relationship depends on the behaviour of the country. They maintain that, irrespective of the 
type of regime (i.e. democratic versus autocratic regimes), if political systems are more 
concerned with international politics, they are equally more likely to be vulnerable to 
transnational terrorism. This is not the case with countries that pursue isolationist projects. 
The nexus between refugees, humanitarian aid and terrorism have been assessed by Choi and 
Salehyan (2014) who have established that “no good deed goes unpunished”. The finding 
builds on the evidence provided which support the perspective that aid allocations enable the 
elite in militant factions to loot and corrupt: incidences which provide opportunities for 
foreign interest in a country to be targeted and attacked by terrorists. In another study 
published the same year, Button (2014) used the mechanisms of “interstate rivalry” in the 
examination of why the use of development assistance for counterterrorism purposes does not 
work in all circumstances. The author maintains that when foreign aid from the United States 
of America (USA) is sent to recipients who are associated with interstate rivalry, the 
underlying recipients also in turn employ development assistance as an instrument of war 
against their rivals. Hence, the foreign aid intended to be used in fighting terrorism is not used 
accordingly, but invested to ensure victory in interstate wars.  
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Button and Carter (2014) have shown that the connection between foreign aid and 
transnational terrorism is contingent on whether terrorism in the country receiving foreign aid 
threatens the interest of the USA or not. The authors have concluded that allocation of 
development assistance from the USA is more directly to countries in which the interests of 
the USA are likely to be targeted by terrorists. Eng and Urperlainen (2015) have established 
that, while for the purpose of credibility, considerable rewards are promised by donors, these 
donors equally promise severe sanctions that are often out of proportion. The authors also find 
that the underlying rewards and sanctions cannot be simultaneously engaged unless such 
actions are supported by domestic interest groups. Asongu and Ssozi (2017) have established 
that foreign aid is most effective in the fight against terrorism in nations where existing levels 
of terrorism are highest.  
The second strand focuses on civil liberties, democracy and state failure. Within this 
framework, Lee (2013) has examined the nexus between democracy, hostage-taking and civil 
liberties in order to provide insights into how types of governments are linked to terrorism. 
The study is based on the premise that terrorism-motivated hostage-taking has a higher 
propensity to be associated with governments that are democratic because much emphasis is 
placed on personal freedom and human values. 
The relationship between “military and economic development assistance from the 
United States” and the rise of anti-American terrorism  is investigated by Gries et al. (2015)  
who conclude that terrorism-related anti-American sentiments are fuelled by a combination of   
dependence (i.e. economic and military reliance) and local repression. No evidence is found 
to support the view that development assistance from the USA helps in making the USA 
safer. Coggins (2015) assesses if state failure causes terrorism to establish that, failed and 
failing states are substantially not associated with higher levels of terrorism. However, nations 
that are collapsing politically and in a state of war, are linked with higher incidences of 
terrorism. Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017) have shown that terrorism affects governance 
dynamics (political, economic and institutional components) whereas Asongu et al. (2018a) 
have concluded that good governance mechanisms (especially political stability) can be used 
to effectively fight terrorism.  
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Table 1: Drivers and Deterrents of Terrorism  
Author(s) Period Sample Methodology Terrorism 
Dynamics 
Instruments  Effects on 
terrorism  
       
Tavares (2004) 1987–
2001 
2725 observations 
and 1428 attacks 
OLS Domestic and 
transnational 
Terrorism 
Democracy  The instrument 
reduces terrorism 
       
Testas (2004) 1968–
1991 
37 Muslim 
countries 
 
Poisson Regression 
Model 
Transnational 
terrorism 
University enrolment The instrument 
increases 
terrorism 
       
Bravo & Dias 
(2006) 
1997–
2004 
60–85 Countries 
 
OLS Domestic and 
transnational 
terrorism 
Adult population 
literacy rate 
The instrument 
reduces terrorism 
       
Drakos & Gofas 
(2006) 
1985–
1998 
139 Countries 
 
Negative Binomial and 
Zero-inflated Negative 
Binomial Regressions 
Transnational 
terrorism 
Trade openness and 
Polity  
The instruments 
reduces terrorism 
       
Kurrild-Klitgaard 
et al. (2006) 
1996–
2002 
97–121 Countries binary logistical 
regression 
Transnational 
terrorism 
political rights and 
civil liberties 
The instruments 
reduces terrorism 
       
Azam &Thelen 
(2008) 
1990–
2004 
176 Countries 
 
negative binomial 
model 
Transnational 
terrorism 
Secondary school 
enrolment  
The instrument 
reduces terrorism 
       
Savun & Phillips 
(2009) 
1968-
2001 
and  
1998-
2004 
163 Countries Zero-Inflated Negative 
Binomial Regression 
Domestic and 
Transnational 
Terrorism  
Democracy and 
foreign policy 
behaviour  
Isolationist 
foreign policy and 
less democracy 
breed less 
terrorism 
       
Azam &Thelen 
(2010) 
1990–
2004 
132 Countries 
 
negative binomial 
model 
Transnational 
terrorism 
Secondary school 
enrolment  
The instrument 
reduces terrorism 
       
Choi (2010) 1984-
2004 
131 countries  negative binomial 
maximum likelihood 
regression, averaged 
negative binomial 
regression and rare 
event logit models 
Domestic and 
international 
terrorism  
Democratic rule of 
law  
The instrument 
reduce terrorism 
       
Krieger & 
Meierrieks (2010) 
 
1980-
2003 
15 Western 
European 
countries  
negative binomial 
count model  
Home-grown 
terrorism 
Social spending  Higher spending 
in some field 
reduces terror 
       
Kavanagh (2011) 1992–
1996 
Lebanon Logit model  Domestic 
terror 
(Hezbollah 
militants) 
The role of education 
and poverty in 
terrorism 
participation  
poverty increases 
terrorism 
participation for 
individuals with 
high education 
       
Bhavnani (2011) 2006-
2008 
Israel and two 
rival Palestinian 
factions 
Logistic regression Transnational 
terrorism 
Selective violence 
based on political 
control  
Selective violence 
based on Israeli 
control 
       
Hoffman et al. 
(2013) 
1975-
1995 
Undisclosed. Use 
of annual costs of 
attacks 
ZINB (zero-inflated 
negative binomial) 
regression models 
Transnational 
terrorism  
Press freedom and 
publicity  
Demand for press 
attention fuels 
terrorism  
       
Lee (2013) 1978-
2005 
Hostage events the multilevel Poisson 
model 
Hostage-taking 
terrorism  
Democratic values 
(Civil liberties and 
press freedom) 
Democratic values 
motivate terrorism 
       
Bell et al. (2014) 1970-
2006 
144 countries  Negative Binomial 
Regression 
Domestic and 
transnational 
terrorism  
Lack of transparency 
(internal & external) 
Internal & 
external 
transparency  
increases 
domestic and 
transnational  
terrorism 
       
Button (2014) 1968-
2008 
Recipients of 
USA foreign aid 
duration and count 
models 
International 
terrorism  
USA foreign aid Effective when 
recipient state do 
not have 
conflicting 
priorities 
       
Button & Carter 
(2014) 
1970-
2007 
USA and USA 
allies  
Non-contemporary 
regressions  
Global and 
transnational 
terrorisms 
USA foreign aid Effective when 
USA interest are 
threatened 
       
Choi & Salehyan 
(2014) 
1970-
2007 
154 Countries  negative binomial 
regression and tobit 
Domestic and 
transnational 
Infusion of aid 
resources  
Countries with 
more refugees 
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model terrorism experience more 
terrorism 
       
Collard-Wexler et 
al. (2014) 
 
1980-
2008 
74 foreign state 
occupations  
Naïve and Hardening 
mechanisms models 
based on Pape’s theory 
of occupation 
Suicide attacks 
in countries 
experiencing 
foreign 
military 
occupation 
Avoidance of foreign 
military interventions 
to mitigate suicide 
attacks in countries 
experiencing military 
interventions. 
Foreign 
occupations 
increases suicide 
attacks  
       
Enders et al. 
(2014) 
1970-
2010 
Undisclosed  Terrorism Lorenz 
curve and nonlinear 
smooth transition 
regressions 
Domestic and 
transitional 
terrorism  
Real GDP per capita  Terrorism more 
concentrated in 
middle-income 
countries  
       
Brockhoff et al. 
(2015) 
1984-
2007 
133 countries Two-step cluster 
analysis 
Domestic 
terrorism  
Education Education 
decreases 
terrorism 
especially when 
socio-economic 
conditions are 
better 
       
Coggins (2015) 1999-
2008 
155 countries  GEE1 Negative 
Binomial 
Location, 
perpetrator, 
domestic, 
domestic-
perpetrator, 
international-
location and 
international-
perpetrator 
terrorisms.  
Stages of failed states  Avoidance of 
failed states in 
war or political 
collapse  
       
Gries et al. (2015) 1984-
2008 
126 countries  Negative Binomial 
Regression and 
System GMM 
Anti-USA 
terrorism  
USA aid dependence  USA aid-
dependence fuels  
Anti-USA 
terrorism  
       
Asongu & Ssozi 
(2017) 
 
1984-
2008 
 
78 developing 
countries  
 
Quantile regressions  
domestic, 
transnational, 
unclear and 
total terrorism 
dynamics 
Bilateral, Multilateral 
and Total aid 
Aid is effective in 
the highest 
quantile of 
transnational 
terrorism  
       
Choi & Piazza 
(2017) 
1981-
2005 
138 Countries  negative binomial 
maximum-likelihood 
regression model  
Suicide attacks 
in countries 
experiencing 
military 
interventions  
Avoidance of foreign 
military interventions 
to mitigate suicide 
attacks in countries 
experiencing military 
interventions. 
Certain features of 
pro-government 
intervention 
increase suicide 
attacks in 
countries 
experience 
military 
interventions  
       
 
 
Asongu & 
Nwachukwu 
(2018a) 
 
 
1984-
2008 
 
 
78 developing 
countries  
 
 
GMM (Roodman) 
 
 
Domestic & 
Transnational  
 
 
Catch-up for policy 
harmonization  
13.34-19.92 years 
for domestic 
terrorism and 
24.67-27.88 years 
for transnational 
terrorism 
       
Asongu et al. 
(2019) 
1998-
2012 
53 African 
countries  
GMM (Roodman) Domestic, 
transitional, 
unclear and  
total terrorism 
dynamics  
Political stability, 
“voice & 
accountability”, 
government 
effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, 
corruption-control 
and the rule of law  
All the engaged 
governance 
instruments 
negatively affect 
terrorism  
       
GMM: Generalized Method of Moments.  
 
 The third strand focuses on papers that have investigated the relationship between 
terrorism and welfare. Kieger and Meirrieks (2010) in this strand have assessed the 
relationship between terrorism and welfare capitalism in the world. The authors have 
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established that in some sectors (e.g. public housing), social spending does not cause 
domestically-grown terrorism. However, the public spending in other sectors (e.g. labour 
market programs, unemployment and health) deter the occurrence of terrorism. In the same 
vein, Asongu et al. (2017) have concluded that inclusive human development is a significant 
tool in the fight against terrorism. The differing nonlinear nexus between terrorism and levels 
of income is examined by Enders et al. (2014) who establish that attacks of transnational and 
domestic nature are apparent in middle income countries. According to Kavanagh (2011), for 
students who have at least a high school educational level, their poverty status increases their 
sympathy for the Hezbollah militant movement. 
The fourth strand is concerned with studies that have assessed the relationship between 
foreign occupation, military interventions and terrorism. In this strand, Collard-Wexler et al. 
(2014) examine whether suicide attacks are motivated by foreign occupation and   find a 
significant impact. Choi and Piazza (2017) assess if suicide attacks are motivated by military 
interventions to find that in exceptional situations, some foreign interventions lead to suicide 
attacks in countries where military interventions occur. Asongu and Amankwah-Amoah 
(2018) have concluded that a critical mass of between 4.224 and 7.363 of military expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP is required to completely nullify the negative effect of terrorism on 
capital flight.  
 
2.2 Social media, ideological polarization and radicalisation  
 
As recently documented by Barberá (2015), social media improves the exposure of citizens to 
diverse political information and political views. This diversity could lead to political 
polarization and ultimately to political terror. The relationship between social media, 
ideological polarization and radicalization can be discussed in two main strands, notably: (i) 
the role of social media in political information and (ii) the importance of social media in 
political polarization and political radicalization.    
 Concerning the first strand, social media enables citizens from different political 
ideologies to connect with each other and exchange information. As substantiated by Kaplan 
and Haenlein (2010), the consumption of political information through social media is not 
exclusively restricted to interactions between friends, family, acquaintance and co-workers. 
Hence, the information diversity and heated exchanges can fuel political polarization and 
radicalization. Accordingly, when citizens are using social media, it is very unlikely for them 
to select the information that they will be exposed to, because information is incidental, in 
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addition to the fact that users are exposed to all information that is shared by their friends and 
acquaintances (Brundidge, 2010).  
 In accordance with Barberá (2015), the diversity of information can best be articulated 
by a report from the Pew Research Center. According to the centre, as of 2013, approximately 
50% of users of social media (i.e. Facebook and Twitter) consumed news from various 
websites. Moreover, according to the same narrative, about 78% of the users were equally 
incidentally exposed to information of political nature. According to Burke and Kraut (2014), 
offline networks overlap with personal networks: which is further evidence of the diversity of 
information that social media users can consume. Furthermore, the firmness of interpersonal 
relationships is contingent on how often users interact with social media and recommend 
news to be consumed by other users (Mutz, 2006; Gilbert & Karahalios, 2009; Bakshy et al., 
2012; Jones et al., 2013;  Messing & Westwood, 2014).  
 With regard to the second consideration on the relevance of social media in political 
radicalization and political polarization, while existing literature has substantially documented 
the role of social media in reducing political polarization and political terror, we argue in this 
study that the relationship between social media and terrorism is still open to debate. The 
underlying studies include: the use of social media to connect users with the same ideological 
standpoints  (Conover et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2014; Barberá & Rivero, 2014; Colleoni et 
al., 2014); the contingency of the exposure to political information on the users’ network 
heterogeneity (Mutz, 2006; Bakshy et al., 2012).  Consistent with Barberá (2015), the 
heterogeneity of information from social media could increase political moderation and less 
violence for various motives, inter alia: political tolerance and “greater awareness of 
rationales for oppositional views” (Mutz, 2002, p.114), a learning mechanism for political 
socialization (Stoker & Jennings, 2008) and mitigation of overconfidence in political 
positions (Ortoleva & Snowberg, 2015; Iyengar et al., 2012).  
 In spite of these tendencies, social media can still promote  political polarization, 
political radicalization and by extension terrorism, because as we have motivated in the 
introduction, there is a strand in the literature maintaining that social media accelerates 
political violence and political instability (Patton et al., 2014; Dreyfuss, 2017a; Browning, 
2018; Storrod & Densley, 2017; Bejan, 2018). Emphasis on political dimensions of instability 
is consistent with the definition of terrorism used in this study, notably: terrorism is defined as 
the actual and threatened use of force by sub-national actors with the purpose of employing 
intimidation to meet political objectives (Enders & Sandler, 2006). 
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3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
This study examines a cross-sectional sample of one hundred and forty eight countries with 
data for the year 2012. The data is obtained from the Global Peace Index (GPI) (2016). The 
sources used in the GPI (2016) include: Qualitative assessments by the Economic Intelligence 
Unit (EIU) analysts’ estimates; the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related 
Deaths Dataset; the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP); the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends; the Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems (CTS); the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the United Nations 
Committee on Contributions and Asongu and Odhiambo (2019b). The dataset is limited to 
one hundred and forty eight countries and for the year 2012 because of data availability 
constraints. Accordingly, Facebook data is available only for the year 2012. It comes from 
Asongu and Odhiambo (2019b) and is measured as the share of population using Facebook. It 
is important to note that “Quintly” which is a social media benchmarking and analytics 
Solution Company is the original source of the data. Consistent with the motivation of this 
study, the Facebook data has been recently used by five studies to assess the relevance of 
social media in development outcomes (Jha & Sarangi, 2017; Kodila-Tedika, 2018; Jha & 
Kodila-Tedika, 2018; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019a, 2019b).  
 The outcome variable is the global terrorism index (GTI) from GTI (2014). This main 
outcome variable is decomposed into four terrorism externalities, namely: terrorism fatalities, 
terrorism incidents, terrorism injuries and terrorism-related property damages. Accordingly, 
the terrorism externalities are the four components of the GTI used as the main outcome 
variable. Consistent with recent literature on conflicts, crimes, violence and terrorism (Blanco 
& Grier, 2009; Freytag et al., 2011; GPI, 2016;  Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016, 2017; 
Asongu et al., 2018c; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018), the study adopts four non-dummy and 
two dummy control variables, namely: access to weapons, violent crime, conflict intensity, 
political instability, low income countries and South Asian nations. The first-four are non-
dummy variables while the last-two are dummy variables. From intuition and corresponding 
literature motivating the choice of the control variables, a positive relationship is expected 
between non-dummy variables and terrorism because these variables reflect risk factors that 
fuel terrorism and associated externalities. The dummy variables are used to control for the 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
 It is important to emphasize that the dependent variables are log-transformed in some 
estimations so that they should be consistent with data behaviour needed for the empirical 
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strategies. Accordingly, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Quantile regressions can use log-
transformed dependent variables. Conversely, count data can be used for the Negative 
Binomial regressions because the empirical strategy is not consistent with dependent variables 
that follow a normal distribution. Appendix 1 provides the definitions and sources of the 
variables while Appendix 2 discloses both the summary statistics in Panel A and sampled 
countries in Panel B. The summary statistics informs the research with two main insights. On 
the one hand, the mean values of the engaged variables are comparable. Accordingly, in the 
empirical literature, units of variables being examined should be comparable in terms of mean 
values in order for the estimation to be robust. For instance, it is not feasible to compare 
decimal points with thousands or millions of units. On the other hand, the variations from the 
perspective of standard deviations are high enough for the study to expect significant 
estimated linkages from the empirical results. The correlation matrix is provided in Appendix 
3. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
3.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares  
An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach is adopted by the study because of the cross 
sectional nature of the dataset. The choice of this estimation approach is in line with recent 
literature based on cross sectional data (Andrés, 2006; Asongu, 2013a; Kodila-Tedika & 
Asongu, 2015). Equation 1 below shows the relationship between terrorism and social media, 
to be estimated 
 
iiii XSMT   321 ,                               (1) 
where iT ( iSM ) represents  a terrorism (social media)  indicator for country i , 1
 
is a 
constant, X  is the vector of control variables, and i  the error term. X contains: access to 
weapons, violent crime, conflict intensity, political instability, low income and South Asia. 
The terrorism indicators are: the global terrorism index, terrorism fatalities, terrorism 
incidents, terrorism injuries and terrorism-related property damages 
 
3.2.2 Negative Binomial Regressions  
  
Given the positive skew associated with the terrorism variables, a Negative Binomial 
regression is also employed on terrorism outcome variables that are not log-transformed. This 
empirical strategy is consistent with recent literature using this type of data (Choi & Luo, 
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2013; Choi, 2015).   In the regression, the mean of y is determined by the exposure time t  and 
a set of k  regressor variables (the x’s). The expression relating these quantities is presented in 
Equation (2): ��= �xp(ln(��) + �1�1� + �2�2� + ⋯ + �k�k�),                      (2) 
where, �1 ≡ 1 and β1 is the intercept. β1, β2, …, βk correspond to unknown parameters to be 
estimated. Their estimates are symbolized as b1, b2, …, bk. The fundamental Negative 
Binomial regression model for an observation i
 
is written as in Equation (3):  
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where,  ii t and 
1 in the generalised Poisson Distribution which  includes a gamma 
noise variable with a mean of 1 and a scale of  . The parameter μ represents the mean 
incidence rate of y per unit of exposure or time. Hence, μ is the risk of a new occurrence of 
the event during a specified exposure period, t (NCSS, 2017).  
 
3.2.3Quantile Regressions  
  
 The OLS and Negative Binomial regressions presented in the previous two sections 
estimate the outcome variable at the mean of the conditional distribution. However, such 
estimation techniques are characterized by the shortcoming that the relationship between 
Facebook penetration and terrorism may be conditional on existing levels of terrorism, such 
that it is important to distinguish between low, intermediate and high initial levels of terrorism 
in the regression exercise. The Quantile regression technique satisfies this requirement 
because parameter estimates are obtained at multiple points of the conditional distribution of 
the outcome variable (Koenker & Bassett, 1978). The Quantile regression approach is being 
increasingly employed in various fields of economic development in order to increase room 
for policy implications, notably: in corruption (Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 
2012; Asongu, 2013b), finance (Asongu, 2014a) and health (Asongu, 2014b) studies.  
The  th quantile estimator of terrorism is obtained by solving the following 
optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts in Eq. (4) for the purpose of 
simplicity and readability.   
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where,  1,0 . Contrary to the OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For 
example the 10th or 25th quantiles (with  =0.10 or 0.25 respectively) by approximately 
weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of terrorism or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/( ,                                                                                                        (5) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are assessed only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of terrorism. For Eq. (5), the dependent variable iy  is 
terrorism while ix  contains a constant term: access to weapons, violent crime, conflict 
intensity, political instability, low income and South Asia. 
 
 
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Terrorism and social media 
In this section, the empirical findings on the relationship between social media and terrorism 
are presented. Table 2 shows results from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Negative 
Binomial regressions whereas Table 3 discloses findings from Quantile regressions. In Table 
2, the OLS results are presented on the left-hand side while the Negative Binomial results are 
provided on the right-hand side. For both estimation techniques in the first table, there is an 
incremental improvement in the variables contained in the conditioning information set. 
Accordingly, the first of the four specifications is a univariate regression whereas the last-
three are multivariate regressions. Whereas the univariate specification is not negatively 
significant in the OLS regressions, it is negatively significant in the Negative Binomial 
regressions. However, as more variables are added to the specifications, the relationship is not 
positively significant for both estimation techniques in the second sets of specifications. In the 
third sets of specifications, Facebook penetration is positively significant in OLS and not in 
the corresponding Negative Binomial regressions. Consistency in the regression output in 
terms of the independent variable of interest is only apparent in the last sets of specifications 
whereas the estimated nexus from Facebook penetration is positively significant in both OLS 
and Negative Binomial specifications.  
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Table 2: Ordinary Least Squares and Negative Binomial regressions  
         
Variables and Information Panel A: Dependent variable: Global Terrorism  
Criteria Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) LnTerrorim Negative Binomial Regression (NBR) Terrorism 
         
Constant  0.868*** 0.005 -0.369 -0.516** 0.850*** -0.819* -1.195** -1.547*** 
 (0.000) (0.984) (0.137) (0.046) (0.000) (0.095) (0.019) (0.002) 
Facebook Penetration  -0.004 0.002 0.008** 0.010** -0.011* 0.002 0.010 0.015** 
 (0.136) (0.493) (0.020) (0.010) (0.050) (0.728) (0.140) (0.040) 
Access to Weapons --- 0.101 -0.029 -0.036 --- 0.201 -0.063 -0.084 
  (0.193) (0.679) (0.597)  (0.119) (0.614) (0.481) 
Violent Crime --- 0.146* 0.038 0.050 --- 0.251** 0.084 0.097 
  (0.059) (0.565) (0.448)  (0.013) (0.446) (0.350) 
Conflict Intensity --- --- 0.431*** 0.397*** --- --- 0.694*** 0.652*** 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Instability  --- --- -0.015 0.042 --- --- -0.095 0.040 
   (0.864) (0.602)   (0.537) (0.785) 
Low Income  --- --- --- -0.054 --- --- --- -0.180 
    (0.707)    (0.451) 
South Asia  --- --- --- 0.900*** --- --- --- 1.141*** 
    (0.000)    (0.001) 
         
         
Fisher  2.24 4.94*** 19.20*** 19.96***     
Adjusted R² 0.013 0.092 0.305 0.367     
Log likelihood     -273.727 -267.429 -253.443 -247.576 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-
Square  
    3.74* 16.33*** 44.31*** 56.04*** 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) for 
Alpha 
    1.185*** 0.986*** 0.600*** 0.449*** 
Pseudo R2      0.029 0.080 0.101 
Observations  148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 
         
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
 Noticeably, our best estimator is also the estimator that is consistently significant in 
the left-hand and right-hand sides. This is essentially because the last sets of specifications in 
the two estimation strategies suffer the least from the issue of “variable omission bias” that is 
likely to bias estimated coefficients. It is also important to note that the coefficient of 
adjustment is highest in the last specification of OLS estimations.  In other words, in the real 
world, Facebook penetration and terrorism do not interact in isolation. The significant 
determinants in the conditioning information set display the expected positive sign.  
The Quantile regressions are presented in Table 3. The fact that the estimated value of 
Facebook penetration differs across specifications in the conditional distribution of terrorism 
is an indication that the choice of the estimation technique is relevant to articulate how 
existing levels of terrorism influence the relationship being investigated. The main finding is 
that the estimated relationship is only significant in the below-median quantiles of the 
conditional distribution of terrorism. In other words, countries in which existing levels of 
terrorism are low are also more significantly associated with a positive Facebook-terrorism 
nexus. The significant control variables display the expected outcomes.  
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Table 3: Quantile Regressions  
      
Variables and Information Dependent variables: Global Terrorism  
     
Criteria Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
      
Constant  -0.148** -0.713*** -0.675 0.126 0.567 
 (0.023) (0.000) (0.140) (0.815) (0.176) 
Facebook Penetration  0.002*** 0.008*** 0.010 0.007 0.006 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.117) (0.366) (0.254) 
Access to Weapons -0.013 0.022 -0.056 -0.182 -0.053 
 (0.365) (0.612) (0.629) (0.254) (0.735) 
Violent Crime 0.003 0.008 0.068 0.118 0.093 
 (0.778) (0.849) (0.504) (0.381) (0.374) 
Conflict Intensity 0.022 0.243*** 0.551*** 0.483*** 0.335*** 
 (0.154) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Instability  0.037** 0.033 -0.045 0.037 0.024 
 (0.023) (0.570) (0.742) (0.812) (0.833) 
Low Income  0.010 0.003 -0.104 -0.181 -0.212 
 (0.729) (0.973) (0.667) (0.559) (0.394) 
South Asia  0.485*** 1.312*** 0.858** 0.860*** 0.482*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) (0.003) (0.007) 
      
Pseudo R2 0.028 0.109 0.278 0.227 0.247 
Observations  148 148 148 148 148 
      
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo R² for quantile 
regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Global  terrorism is least. 
 
 
4.2 Extension with externalities of terrorism and social media  
 
 In this section, we further assess if the established positive relationship between 
Facebook penetration and terrorism withstands empirical scrutiny when terrorism is 
decomposed into constituent elements, namely: terrorism fatalities, terrorism incidents, 
terrorism injuries and terrorism-related property damages. Hence, instead of having one 
dependent variable as with the previous regressions, we have four dependent variables. The 
corresponding findings are presented in Table 4. In the table, the OLS results are provided on 
the left-hand side while Negative Binomial findings are disclosed on the right-hand side. In 
both estimation techniques, control variables used for the regressions in Tables 2-3 are 
employed in the estimations. However, owing to lack of space, the control variables are not 
reported. It is apparent from the findings that the positive association between Facebook 
penetration and terrorism withstands empirical scrutiny within the framework of externalities 
of terrorism.  
 The analysis in Table 3 is also replicated for Quantile regressions within the context of 
terrorism externalities. Unfortunately, the findings are not feasible throughout the conditional 
distribution of the outcome variables owing to issues in degrees of freedom. The 
corresponding findings which are not used for policy implications are available upon request. 
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Table 4: OLS and Negative Binomial extensions with Externalities of Terrorism  
  
Variables and Dependent Variables: Externalities of  Terrorism 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS): LnTerrorism Negative Binomial Regression (NBR): Terrorism 
Information Criteria         Ln.Incidents Ln.Fatalities Ln.Injuries Ln.Property 
Damages  
Incidents  Fatalities  Injuries  Property 
Damages  
Constant  -2.108*** -2.295*** -2.671*** -1.741*** -3.027** -4.434*** -4.605*** -5.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.021) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) 
Facebook Penetration  0.026*** 0.015* 0.021** 0.018** 0.046** 0.014 0.021 0.051** 
 (0.002) (0.060) (0.021) (0.012) (0.027) (0.542) (0.368) (0.014) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Fisher  12.15*** 8.76*** 11.76*** 8.37***     
Adjusted R² 0.401 0.408 0.420 0.378     
Log likelihood     -380.763 -307.922 -358.881 -281.745 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) 
Chi-Square  
    71.83*** 73.92*** 65.45*** 68.48*** 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) for 
Alpha 
    5.173*** 6.816*** 8.210*** 5.276*** 
Pseudo R²     0.086 0.107 0.083 0.108 
         
Observations  148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 
         
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
 
5. Concluding remarks and future research direction 
 
The study has assessed the relationship between terrorism and social media from a cross 
section of 148 countries with data for the year 2012. The empirical evidence is based on 
Ordinary Least Squares, Negative Binomial and Quantile regressions. The main finding is that 
there is a positive relationship between social media in terms of Facebook penetration and 
terrorism. The positive relationship is driven by below-median quantiles of terrorism. In other 
words, countries in which existing levels of terrorism are low are more significantly 
associated with a positive Facebook-terrorism nexus. A reason  why such significant 
association is more apparent in countries with low levels of terrorism could be that, in 
countries where terrorism levels are high, other social media and information technology 
platforms are used for the organisation and coordination of terrorism activities.  The 
established positive relationship is confirmed from other externalities of terrorism: terrorism 
fatalities, terrorism incidents, terrorism injuries and terrorism-related property damages. The 
terrorism externalities are constituents of the composite dependent variable.  
 The fact that the Facebook-terrorism nexus is exclusively apparent in countries where 
initial levels of terrorism are low is an indication that blanket policies pertaining to the 
investigated relationship are ineffective unless they are contingent on varying levels of 
terrorism and tailored differently across countries with low, intermediate and high initial 
levels of terrorism.  
 The findings in this study have clarified the existing debate in the literature on whether 
social media fuels or mitigates terrorism. To this end, we have used a hitherto unexplored 
dataset on Facebook penetration. Hence, while the findings are consistent with the strand of 
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literature supporting the positive role of social media in violence, conflicts, crimes and 
terrorism (Wolfsfeld et al., 2013;  Bastos et al., 2015; Dreyfuss, 2017a; Browning, 2018; 
Patton et al., 2014; Storrod & Densley, 2017; Bejan, 2018), at the same time, the findings 
counteract the results maintaining that social media can be effectively used to curb terrorism 
and violence (Barberá, 2015; Parkyn, 2017). It what follows, more implications are discussed 
in the light of contributions of the study to the information systems community.  
 It is apparent from the findings that the managing body of Facebook may not be doing 
enough in prevention of the use of its social media platform to fight terrorism (Dreyfuss, 
2017b). However, this inference should be considered in the light of the sampled year and 
hence, may not reflect contemporary efforts by Facebook to stamp-out the use of the social 
media platform for the organisation and coordination of terrorism. In essence, more complex 
algorithms need to be developed to trace and address online content that is characterised by 
extremist rhetoric, violent images, organisation of violence and propagation of hate. 
Moreover, it is worthwhile for Facebook and by extension, the information systems 
community to work hand-in-hand with the law enforcement and terrorism experts in order to 
improve on identification and monitoring parameters of terrorism.   
 Beyond the above recommendations, the surge in terrorism tendencies (especially 
transnational terrorism) will require some policy harmonization among elements of the 
information systems community as well as between governments hosting these underlying 
communities. In other words, country-specific policies may not be enough if terrorists are 
using the same social media platforms and mechanisms worldwide. Therefore, the suggested 
policy harmonization should entail the sharing of intelligence against terrorism, adoption of 
most efficient tools in the fight against terrorism as well as the development of common 
algorithms that are designed to combat the scourge. In regions already sharing common 
economic policies such as the African (AU) and the European Union (EU), a legal framework 
coupled with a collaborative environment is worthwhile. Accordingly, such international 
frameworks are essential because terrorism and hate speeches are not limited to one specific 
country, but permeate boarders and hence, common legislation and mechanisms are 
imperative. In summary, Facebook and by extension, the information systems community 
should cooperate in improving sensitization and awareness against terrorism as well as 
developing common cross-country Terrorism Tracking Systems (TTS) pertaining to social 
media.  
The main caveat of this study is that the established findings are relationships and 
hence causality should not be inferred from them unless the results are substantiated with 
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other estimation techniques from which causality can be inferred, as more data become 
available. This caveat also doubles as a future research direction. Furthermore, it is also 
worthwhile to emphasize that Facebook may not be representative of social media. However, 
given data availability constraints, other variables of social media could not be taken on board 
and therefore should be considered in future studies.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Definitions and sources of variables 
  
Variables  Definitions of variables and sources  
  
Global Terrorism   Global Terrorism Index  (GTI, 2014) 
  
  
Terrorism incidents  Logarithm (1+ base) of  Total number of terrorist incidents in a given year. 
  
Terrorism fatalities  Logarithm (1+ base) of  Total number of fatalities caused by terrorists in a given 
year 
  
Terrorism injuries  Logarithm (1+ base) of  Total number of injuries caused by terrorists in a given 
year 
  
Terrorism-related property 
damages  
Logarithm (1+ base) of the measure of the total property damage from terrorist 
incidents in a given year. 
  
Facebook Penetration  Facebook penetration (2012), defined as the percentage of total population that 
uses Facebook (Asongu &  Odhiambo, 2019b).  
  
Access to Weapons  Ease of access to small arms and light weapons (Global Peace Index, 2016) 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts (Global Peace Index, 2016) 
 
  
Violent crime  Level of violent crime (Global Peace Index, 2016) 
 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts (Global Peace Index, 2016) 
 
  
Conflict Intensity  Conflict Intensity (Global Peace Index, 2016) 
 
  
Political instability  Political instability 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts (Global Peace Index, 2016) 
  
  
“Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).  The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The  Economic 
Intelligence Unit (EIU). United Nations Peacekeeping Funding (UNPKF). GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).  
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics and presentation of countries  
      
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variables  Mean  Standard dev. Minimum Maximum  Obsers 
      
Global Terrorism (Ln)   0.796 0.753 0.000 2.306 148 
      
Terrorism incidents(Ln) 1.243 1.766 0.000 7.263 148 
      
Terrorism fatalities(Ln) 1.069 1.840 0.000 7.920 148 
     1 
Terrorism injuries(Ln) 1.268 2.105 0.000 8.803 148 
      
Terrorism-related property 
damages(Ln) 
0.855 1.452 0.000 6.532 148 
Facebook Penetration  19.868 18.566 0.038 97.636 148 
      
Access to Weapons 3.118 1.077 1.000 5.000 148 
      
Violent Crime  2.774 1.109 1.000 5.000 148 
      
Conflict Intensity 2.432 1.164 1.000 5.000 148   
      
Political Instability  2.546 1.004 1.000 5.000 148 
      
      
Panel B: Sampled countries (148) 
 “Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; 
Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; 
Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; 
Colombia; Costa Rica; Croatia; Cyprus;  Czech Republic;  Democratic Republic of the Congo; Denmark; 
Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Estonia; Ethiopia; 
Finland; France; Gabon; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; 
Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; 
Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia (FYR); Madagascar; 
Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; 
Mozambique; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger;  Nigeria; Norway; Oman; 
Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea;  Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of the 
Congo; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; 
Somalia; South Africa; South Korea; Spain; Sri Lanka; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Tajikistan; Tanzania; 
Thailand; The Gambia; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United 
Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen 
and Zambia”. 
      
      
Standard dev: standard deviation. Obsers: Observations.   
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix  
           
Weapons Crime Confl. 
Inten 
Pol. 
Inst 
Facebook Terror 
Incidents 
Terror 
Fatalities 
Terror 
Injuries 
Terror 
Prop.D 
Global 
Terrorism 
 
1.000 0.636 0.605 0.615 -0.545 0.278 0.373 0.345 0.288 0.251 Weapons 
 1.000 0.563 0.492 -0.449 0.314 0.401 0.360 0.317 0.284 Crime 
  1.000 0.685 -0.531 0.490 0.552 0.564 0.462 0.517 Conf. Intern  
   1.000 -0.650 0.274 0.339 0.363 0.233 0.280 Pol. Inst. 
    1.000 -0.097 -0.223 -0.210 -0.103 -0.114 Facebook 
     1.000 0.912 0.924 0.970 0.849 Terror incidents  
      1.000 0.950 0.911 0.778 Terror Fatalities  
       1.000 0.915 0.799 Terror Injuries  
        1.000 0.790 Terror Prop. D 
         1.000 Global Terrorism 
           
Weapon:  Access to weapons. Crime: Violent crime. Pol. Inst: Political  Instability. Facebook: Facebook Penetration.   Terror Prop. D: 
Terror-related Property Damages.  
 
 
